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Abstract 
The present paper aim to develop the Austrian Theory of Business Cycle in order to conclude that 
economic fluctuations are unavoidable. The conventional version of Austrian business cycle theory 
focuses on a temporary imbalance between natural and monetary rates of interest. When, because of 
the role of monetary authorities in defining the monetary rate, the two values are in a situation of 
imbalance, the resulting expansion stage is followed by a recession. On the other hand, if instead the 
expansive phase arises without any interference by monetary authorities but through re-adaptation of 
the productive structure to a modified structure of temporal preferences, a period of sustainable 
growth begins that will not be followed by a crisis. The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate, on the 
other hand, that because of profit-expectations and the combined action of Schumpeterian elements 
(imitations-speculations and the ‘creation of money’ by banks), even a so-called ‘sustainable’ boom 
will be affected by a liquidation and settling crisis. What distinguishes the latter situation from the 
conventional case of imbalance between monetary and natural rates is not the onset or otherwise of a 
crisis but, rather, its intensity and duration. We will define as natural an economic cycle characterised 
by a stage of expansion considered to be ‘sustainable’ in the Austrian theory but followed by an 
inevitable readjustment crisis. In conclusion we will try to link our theoretical conclusions with the 
crisis emerged in the Western world in 2007, to test the explanatory power of our theoretical 
framework. 
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1. INTRODUCTION. ON THE INEVITABILITY OF ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS 
The economic crisis that erupted in 2007 was presented, when it burst in the summer of 
that year, with bank and stock market collapses, as a typical financial crisis. This presentation 
was followed by numerous attacks on the free market and the capitalist system; sometime 
ideologically targeted yet often incapable of grasping the true nature of the crisis.  
Subsequently, the emphasis shifted to the question of public indebtedness and, in 2013, to 
the single European currency, with the clear intention on the part of certain Governments to 
return to the possibility of devaluing a national currency in order to obtain short term export.  
Nowadays, the great depression is still and mostly labelled as the 20081 financial crisis; 
our analysis, on the other hand, will show that: 
1. the crisis cannot be called neither financial, nor fiscal, nor even one of currency; 
2. the crisis is more generally economic in nature and caused by systematic modifications of 
the structure of production and the allocation of employment resources. 
The crisis drove Sachs (2010, 20) to conclude that «classic Keynesians are singing their 
swan song» and that «faced by a public debt crisis, the time has come to abandon short-term 
theories and prioritize the long-term investments needed to ensure a solid recovery». 
However, the great depression did not bury Keynesian economists; lead by Krugman (2008), 
post-Keynesian analyses did not miss the chance for asking for more government 
intervention, consumption stimuli and relaxation of public budget constraints2; for many of 
them, moreover, it was occasion to ask for further financial regulation. On the opposite side, 
Austrian economists took occasion to revive the Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) and 
to point the finger against the distortive action played by government intervention and in 
particular by central banks3. Neoclassical economists, instead, suffered more than the others, 
apparently unable to deal with the events and focusing on proposing further interest rate cut. 
Some of them brought out interesting reflections, questioning the mainstream approach and 
trying to incorporate heterodox elements in their analyses; it is the case, i.e., of Borio (2012) 
and Calvo (2013). Leijonhufvud (2009), illuminating as usual, presents an analysis that tries 
to learn from Keynes, the Austrians and Hyman Minsky. 
The most interesting fact emerging from the post-crisis economic debate is maybe that, 
while neoclassical mainstream is suffering, old heterodox schools are trying to revive 
themselves and face a growing consensus. Under this perspective it emerges that the 
Hayek/Keynes debate is far to be defunct. Disciples of the two great economists are still on 
the fighting ring. Keynesians blame the free market while Austrians believe that without 
government induced monetary distortions crises would not arise.  
According to our vision, instead, the first point to stress is that economic crises do not 
demonstrate the end of the capitalist economic system; on the contrary, they testify its 
vitality. In Ferlito (2013, 30) and in Ferlito (2014a) we tried to demonstrate that capitalism 
without fluctuations does not exist4. Indeed, we find ourselves in good company when 
believing that the cycle is the real form of economic development in a capitalistic system5. 
Marx was the first to realize this6. The same awareness is to be seen in Schumpeter’s vision, 
influenced by Spiethoff (1925, 112), who concludes that «the cyclical upswings and 
downswings are the evolutionary forms of the highly developed capitalist economy and their 
                                                          
1 Not only the crisis is not financial, but economic; it started to emerge in 2007. See Ferlito (2007).  
2 See, i.e., Roncaglia (2010). 
3 Among the others, see Salerno (2012), Hülsmann (2013) and Ferlito (2013). 
4 Huerta de Soto (1998, 468) points out that «[o]ne of the more curious points on which a certain agreement 
exists [between Marxian and Austrian analysis] relates precisely to the theory of the crises and recessions which 
systematically ravage the capitalist system». 
5 Ferlito (2011, 96). 
6 Rothbard (1969, 13). 
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antithetic stimuli condition its progress». In turn, the Austrian economist influenced his 
student Paolo Sylos Labini7, and similar considerations can be found in Lachmann (1956, 
110-112). Realising that the cyclic form is typical of capitalist development is also echoed in 
the words of another Italian economist, Marco Fanno (1931, 248-249)  
Supported by the testimony of such economists, we shall bring out the motivations which 
drove us to the same conclusions. The core of our analysis will be the accent on the role of 
expectations, time preferences and innovation mechanisms. We will build our theory on the 
pillar of the ABCT; however, as we shall demonstrate, Mises’s approach, supporting the thesis 
that crises happen only when monetary authorities intervene on the money supply, needs to 
be overcome. Austrian tradition, in fact, distinguishes between sustainable and unsustainable 
booms; only in the latter situation crises arise. Instead, we will argue that depressions always 
follow booms; the difference is only in intensity and duration. In order to support our view, 
we shall abandon Mises’s view and use instead Hayek’s perspective as starting point. Such 
perspective will be then integrated with key elements coming from Schumpeter and 
Lachmann.   
 
 
2. METHODOLOGICAL INTERMEZZO: WHY ECONOMIC THEORY FAILED IN FORECASTING 
THE CRISIS  
 
We believe that modern macroeconomics failed to understand economic fluctuations 
because it is prisoner of a static paradigm (general economic equilibrium), founded on 
econometric predictions. However, crises cannot be understood with the equilibrium 
framework.  
First of all is thus necessary to define the nature of the object of investigation. Indeed, 
method is imposed by the object. This does not mean surrendering to indistinct 
methodological relativism but acknowledging that the phenomena of reality are complex and 
varied in nature. 
The problem of business cycles is, of course, a dynamic one. As all economic theory, it 
should related to reality, to living human beings, dynamically acting in a specific time and 
space framework. The centre of economic analysis, in our view, is therefore human action. 
Dealing with real people is very different from dealing with phenomena in physics or 
chemistry or natural sciences in general.  
In this context, it is evident that the proper perspective for studying dynamic economic 
phenomena is subjective. The first fact to be noted as regards studying individuals and their 
actions is that every gesture is guided by a principle of finality. As we shall see in the 
following paragraphs, it is the purpose, expectation that determines the action.  
Economists are thus faced by qualitatively very well defined elements: man and reality. 
They should be inspired by these elements, should allow themselves to be astonished by what 
happens. The essence of an economist’s work lies in observation of reality, without seeking 
to put it in a cage. Observation of reality helps identify certain dynamic trends that represent 
constants in human action. For example, as we have seen, the human action has a finalistic 
nature. That is not to say, as in the rationalist terms of the general equilibrium theory, that 
every subject maximizes units of utility in accordance with mathematical models. This is not 
what happens in reality. It is true8, however, as a dynamic trend, that man acts to achieve 
goals9. This sees the onset of relationships with the surroundings, people, things and complex 
                                                          
7 See Sylos Labini (1954, 12-14) and Sylos Labini (1984, 37 and 89). 
8 ‘True’ means much more than ‘rational’.  
9 The fragments of what he believed to be his most general happiness. 
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society in general. Economists may certainly analyse everything that individuals do within 
the dynamics of enterprise in the search to attain their objectives. 
This definition may seem extraneous to more familiar concepts in economics such as 
prices, interest rates, profit and loss, etc. But this is not the case. As we will see later, when 
defining their goals, people also choose the means for achieving them. In doing so, the 
attainment of other goals is waived and this becomes the cost of the action. If the goal is 
reached within the desired terms, and the satisfaction achieved is superior to the waiver, then 
the outcome is positive. Prices, in numerical terms, are merely a brief representation of 
subjective assessments and their variegated universe. In the course of their actions, 
individuals meet each other and, unconsciously, their assessments of ends and means meet in 
turn and start an unending journey of mediation. The market comes into being as a 
spontaneous institution, a place for relationships, where the individual choice over means and 
ends is challenged through inter-relationships. The system of prices emerges in this process 
as the mediated (objective) result of the combination of subjective assessments. This system 
of values allows those involved make rational economic calculations and verify, over time, 
whether they are attaining their goals or not. 
It is possible to study these dynamics but without any pretence of planning and inclusion 
of attitudes within strict and formal models. Explanations are possible, only they must be of a 
qualitative nature. And achieving this requires the right set of tools. 
In conclusion, the business of the economic scientist is possible if the search of functional 
relations is replaced by the desire to really understand how reality works, abandoning every 
constructivist temptation determined by pseudo-scientific dazzle or the possibility of perfect 
planning.  
 
 
3. HUMAN ACTION, TIME AND EXPECTATIONS 
 
As we already mentioned, at the very heart of economic theory we must place human 
action. Two essential phenomena surround it: expectations and time. Expectations are indeed 
at the very root of any economic process. They are the element guiding men toward action. 
Action is always purposeful action. We act in order to achieve goals, which are set according 
to our expectations. The next step is that, in order to achieve the desired goals, human beings 
need to implement plans, choosing the means they believe to be appropriate in order to reach 
ends. What we call market process is nothing more than the interactions of human beings 
busy implementing plans to achieve goals. One thing must be noted. Mainstream economics 
treat ends and means as given; moreover, knowledge is often considered perfect and 
unchangeable. What happens in reality, instead, is that the content of available information is 
always changing and the market is precisely the place where the exchange of knowledge 
happens. In the flow of real time, thus, plans can be revised.  
Consumers, entrepreneur–producers and resource owners are the players in the market; 
the latter, in turn, is where their interacting decisions, during any period of time, take place. 
Every player has his own content of (limited) knowledge, tastes and expectations. Depending 
on their knowledge, tastes and expectations, the players set up their action decisions, or plans. 
Since, in order to carry out their plans, individuals need to interact, it is only through 
interaction and in time that content of information will be modified and eventually a revision 
of decisions can happen10. 
As defined by Kirzner, then, market process is built up by «this series of systematic 
changes in the interconnected network of market decisions». Therefore, it is not possible to 
                                                          
10 See Kirzner (1973, 10). 
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conceive a market process in the realm of perfect knowledge. The process arises precisely 
because of the initial ignorance of market participants and the natural uncertainty of human 
action. And the process can only happen during the flow of real time. With no market 
ignorance and no review of plans, there is no process at all. As explained by Kirzner, since 
from one period of market ignorance to the next one, ignorance has been somewhat reduced, 
market participants realize that not only should they implement more attractive opportunities 
but also that such attractiveness needs to be judged in comparison with the opportunities 
offered by competitors. This is the competitive process. When the incentive to offer more 
attractive opportunities stops, such process stops, too. In a situation of market equilibrium, 
such as the one described by the neoclassical theory of perfect competition, there is no more 
room for competition at all. 
It becomes now necessary to explain what we means when we talk about real time. At 
first sight, it may seem that contemporary economic theory has included time in its historical 
calculations based on historic series, econometric functions and stylised models. However, 
such a perception of time, while perhaps being useful in the study of physical sciences, is 
rather unsuitable for the discovery and surprise dynamics typical of human action. It is what 
we may define as Newtonian time. 
 
The Newtonian conception of time is spatialized; that is, its passage is represented or symbolized by 
“movements” along a line. Different dates are then portrayed as a succession of line segments (discrete time) or 
points (continuous time). In either case, time is fully analogized to space, and what is true of the latter becomes 
true of the former. (O’Driscoll and Rizzo, 1985, 82). 
 
O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985, 82-85) emphasise that time conceived in this way has three 
main characteristics: homogeneity, mathematical continuity and causal inertia. Homogeneity 
means that different temporal moments are simply points in space, a temporal position; 
nothing may happen between one moment and another. This means that homogeneous time is 
fundamentally static. Mathematical continuity, on the other hand, implies that time is simply 
a sequence of moments, which may even be different, but no change can take place 
endogenously. Since time is a sequence of static situations, each change must be exogenous. 
Causal inertia, lastly, means that nothing happens with the flow of time. There is no learning, 
there is no change in knowledge or adjustment of expectations. The system itself must 
already contain all the elements needed for it to function. It is evident such a concept lends 
itself poorly to representing unpredictable and dynamic human actions. 
What interests us, on the other hand, is real time, a «dynamically continuous flow of 
novel experiences. […] We cannot experience the passage of time except as a flow: 
something new must happen, or real time will cease to be»11. As described by O’Driscoll and 
Rizzo (1985, 89-91), the characteristics of real time are precisely to opposite to those of 
Newtonian time. They are: dynamic continuity, heterogeneity and causal efficacy. If we 
consider dynamic continuity, time must consist of memory and expectations; i.e. it is 
structurally related moments, past and future, through the perceptions of the individual; one 
cannot imagine a present without memory of the past and expectations for the future; 
inasmuch, all the moments in the flow of time are intimately linked and reciprocally 
influenced. Heterogeneity, on the other hand, means that in each successive moment the 
individual’s perception has of the facts may be, and in fact is, different: the past, once it has 
occurred, becomes memory, enhancing the present and thereby also changing perception of 
the future; therefore, the perception of things changes from moment to moment, thereby 
making the characteristics of a given moment in time radically different from those of the 
previous moment. The direct consequence of heterogeneity is causal efficacy; the flow of 
                                                          
11 O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985, 89). 
7 | P a g e  
 
time modifies knowledge, awareness and information, thereby expanding the creative 
potential of human action. Yet this is possible precisely because of acquisitions made 
‘beforehand’ in time. 
We can now introduce two more elements crucial to our analysis. They are time 
preferences and the inter-temporal structure of production. According to the law of time 
preference, «other things being equal, humans always place present goods higher than future 
goods on their scales of value»12; starting from this assumption, the Austrian School comes to 
a definition of interest rate radically opposed to that of the dominant theory (‘cost of money’). 
We may define «the interest rate [as] the market price of present goods in terms of future 
goods»13. It is therefore limiting and profoundly wrong to define the interest rate as the cost 
of money. The law of time preference does not apply only to the capital market. It should be 
extended to the entire economic system, where the natural rate is consequently that rate of 
equilibrium which reflects the temporal preferences of economic agents. It is thus possible to 
define an interest rate for the economic system, which measures the more general structure of 
time preferences. As regards consumers, it defines the relationship between consumption and 
saving. In the case of entrepreneurs linked to investments, it measures the propensity towards 
the future, that desire to undertake long-term projects in the investment goods sector that 
makes the production structure more circular and the production period longer, compared to 
investments in consumer goods and investments having a faster realisation cycle. 
In a future-oriented system, consumers are more savings-oriented, thereby encouraging 
the accumulation of loanable funds that can be used by entrepreneurs in long-term projects. A 
present-oriented society, in contrast, has a greater propensity towards consumption on the 
consumer side, while investors do not lengthen the production process. Situations of 
equilibrium may exist in a system with a high time preference as on the contrary. It is not the 
sum of one of the aggregates that defines this equilibrium but the possibility for time 
preferences to come together through the free exercise of the entrepreneurial function that 
each person enacts in relationships with other people in the process of satisfying needs of 
various kinds. 
The level of equilibrium for a combination of time preferences is measured by the natural 
interest rate, which in turn corresponds to a well-defined structure of the production process. 
The key element that, by fuelling a modification of the inter-temporal structure of production, 
generates a cycle of expansion and crisis is given by a change in level of the natural rate. 
According to the traditional Austrian perspective, if the mutation of the natural interest rate 
reflects a change in time preferences, this generates a positive expansive cycle, which will not 
be followed by a painful crisis (and we will seek to demonstrate, on the other hand, that a 
readjustment crisis is inevitable). Conversely, if the rate – rather than settling in response to 
interaction on the free market of entrepreneurial action of different individuals – is set by 
central planning authorities which follow precepts of monetary policy or political 
motivations, the expansive cycle that will be followed by monetary expansion will generate a 
crisis. In fact, there will have been no change in the natural rate and no change in time 
preferences; the change generated in the structure of production will be the outcome of a false 
signal, the manipulation generated by monetary authorities. 
To summarize: expectations generate action plan, who are carried out in time and 
eventually revised in order to cope with modified information, which, in turn, can force 
expectations to change. Expectations define also the time preference of an economic system; 
action plans set the intertemporal structure of the production process, which, as a process, is 
subject to a continuous revision. In any moment, the time preference of the system is a 
                                                          
12 Huerta de Soto (2000, 50) 
13 Huerta de Soto (2000, 50-51). 
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measured by what the Austrian tradition, following Wicksell, calls the natural interest rate, 
defined as the price of present goods in terms of future goods. The natural interest rate, 
therefore, is generated by expectations too.  
Expectations are consequently the hallmark of a society made of real players which, 
starting precisely from them, form their own plans for the future, meeting and modifying 
knowledge and the plans themselves. This generates the kaleidic society14, «a society in 
which sooner or later unexpected change is bound to upset existing patterns, a society 
“interspersing its moments or intervals of order, assurance and beauty with sudden 
disintegration and a cascade into a new pattern”»15. The kaleidoscopic world is a world where 
change is constant.  
In a kaleidoscopic society, moreover, 
 
the equilibrating forces, operating slowly, especially where much of the capital equipment is durable and 
specific, are always overtaken by unexpected change before they have done their work, and the results of their 
operation disrupted before they can bear fruit. […] Equilibrium of the economic system as a whole will thus 
never be reached. (Lachmann, 1976, 60-61). 
 
From what we saw so far we can conclude that expectations are not something “up in the 
clouds”, to be treated as exogenous data; without them, there is no economic activity as such; 
it is starting from expectations that every decision is taken with the intention of making a 
profit or achieving personal satisfaction. However, these attempts emerge in a context of 
imperfect knowledge and an unexpected and unpredictable future16. Uncertainty is a key 
element in the economic process; we cannot even imagine that opportunities for profit will 
arise outside a context of uncertainty and disequilibrium17. In fact, without uncertainty, all 
occasions for profit would have already been exhausted; in an uncertain context, on the other 
hand, entrepreneurs who make the best forecasts or people who, for various reasons, best 
fulfil their expectations and plans, enjoy an advantage created precisely by the fact of 
knowing better how to move in such a context, how to ‘imagine the future better’. 
The main features of true uncertainty «are the inherent unlistability of all possible 
outcomes resulting from a course of action, and the complete endogeneity of the 
uncertainty»18. Inasmuch, if uncertainty is endogenous to the system, an intrinsic feature, it 
cannot but originate a constantly changing system, in which human action is essentially 
guided by expectations: expectations determined by preferences, that in turn generate any 
kind of action. Such action is intrinsically uncertain, in that nothing, a priori, ensures that 
such expectations will be realized. 
The accumulation of knowledge merely changes the uncertainty19. The information 
content is not complete, only larger. Aspects affecting the pursuit of action have changed but 
are not complete. The outlines on the horizon, and consequently the uncertainty in relation to 
the complete form, are different. It is therefore clear that the theoretical bridge between 
preferences and action is made of expectations: desires as regards the future and the scenarios 
awaiting us take place, determining our possibility for action.  
It is evident that expectations cannot be considered, as in neoclassical theory, as a static 
element fixed at the beginning of the match and then unchangeable until the final result is 
achieved. On the contrary, since human action is a dynamic process that unfolds over time, 
                                                          
14 See Shackle (1972, 76-79).  
15 Lachmann (1976, 54) 
16 See Lachmann (1982).  
17 Rizzo (1979, 10).  
18 O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985, 100). 
19 O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985, 102-103).  
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the set of information available to players constantly changes, bringing about a continual 
modification of expectations, objectives and plans. 
 
 
4. AT THE ORIGIN OF ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS: THE INTERTEMPORAL STRUCTURE OF 
PREFERENCES 
 
Economic fluctuations are related with the modification of the intertemporal structure of 
preferences. At any given time, a time preference structure is matched by a production 
structure, i.e. a heterogeneous set of combinations of production factors, organized by human 
creative and entrepreneurial action in order to carry out processes that, over time, generate an 
output. This output should meet a demand defined by the structure of time preferences. This 
structure is reflected in an interest rate that, in turn, expresses the magnitude of the preference 
of economic agents for present goods compared to future goods. 
The central point is the distortion of the production structure defined by the system of 
preferences20, and the reasons behind such a modification. The system of time preferences is 
determined by the expectations of players on the market who, following their own 
expectations, seek to implement plans to achieve them. In a free market system, this 
mechanism of action takes place through the meeting of different subjects who in the process 
acquire new information and change their expectations. We are therefore witnessing a 
gradual and continuous process of re-adaptation of plans, in a natural effort to ensure that 
their realization ‘meets’ the realization of the plans of others. 
 
4.1 The unsustainable boom 
 
The typical situation taken in account by the ABCT (Mises) is when a natural rate is 
flanked by a monetary rate set by a central authority. In this scenario, the signal role played 
by the monetary rate overpowers that of the equilibrium rate, because it is immediately 
publicized and more visible to the players on the market: it ‘anticipates’ the discovery 
mechanism typical of the market, it creates a wall between supply a demand. The monetary 
rate, inasmuch, becomes one of the essential engines driving expectations and the subsequent 
formation of plans. A difference between the natural rate and the monetary rate, by 
disorienting certain agents, may therefore modify the structure of production but without this 
change reflecting a parallel change in time preferences. Or, another possibility is that the 
monetary rate may not follow a unilateral change in preferences, thereby interfering with the 
process of adaptation by the economic system whose own preferences have not changed. 
Let us now assume starting from a situation of equilibrium, a hypothetical starting point 
‘0’. We have a natural rate that reflects the meeting of time preferences and a production 
structure organised accordingly. Let’s also suppose that the monetary rate set by central 
authorities is the same as the equilibrium rate. In this scenario, a disequilibrium between 
monetary rate and equilibrium value, whereby the former is at a value lower than the second, 
thereby prompting entrepreneurs to lengthen the production process, may arise in two ways. 
The first and most immediately intuitable hypothesis is that the central authorities cut the 
monetary rate in the belief that lowering the interest rate sets in motion an expansion cycle 
without negative repercussions. In such a scenario, central bank is misleading the profit 
expectations of entrepreneurs, wrongly informing them that new resources are available for 
investments. Therefore, entrepreneurs consider it is more convenient to invest in long-term 
projects; however their choices are wrongly guided a false signal, which, in ‘hiding’ the 
                                                          
20 Hayek (1929, 123). 
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natural rate, does not allow the system to activate the necessary counter-measures to the 
resurgence of natural tendencies towards equilibrium typical of a regime of freedom of 
entrepreneurial action. Entrepreneurs, following interest rate manipulation, become more 
future-oriented, although more savings are not generated; consequently, available resources 
are fictitious and time preferences are changed unilaterally, leading to a disequilibrium in 
inter-temporal preferences; future-oriented investors and present-oriented consumers (or not 
as future-oriented as entrepreneurs). A change in time preferences always happens 
unilaterally, but when only the natural interest rate plays a role this change can be 
communicated to the other side of the market. The monetary interest rates does not allow the 
natural one to play is information transmission role.  
Yet the situation whereby the monetary interest rate is below the natural rate may also 
occur without the intervention of central banks. In fact, the natural rate can be pushed 
upwards by expanding profit expectations. Entrepreneurial action, while always seeking 
results, may be also determined by so-called sentiment, the inkling that certain initiatives 
might be profitable. In this situation, entrepreneurs become future-oriented, raising the 
interest rate level and pushing demand for funds to begin the longer-term production 
processes. 
 
It is an apparently unimportant difference in exposition which leads one to this view that the Monetary 
Theory can lay claim to an endogenous position. The situation in which the money rate of interest is below the 
natural rate need not, by any means, originate in a deliberate lowering of the rate of interest by the banks. The 
same effect can be obviously produced by an improvement in the expectations of profit or by a diminution in the 
rate of saving, which may drive the ‘natural rate’ (at which the demand for and the supply of savings are equal) 
above its previous level; while the banks refrain from raising their rate of interest to a proportionate extent, but 
continue to lend at the previous rate, and thus enable a greater demand for loans to be satisfied than would be 
possible by the exclusive use of the available supply of savings. (Hayek, 1929, 147). 
 
There can be many kinds of reasons for this. 
 
New inventions or discoveries, the opening up of new markets, or even bad harvests, the appearance of 
entrepreneurs of genius who originate ‘new combinations’ (Schumpeter), a fall in wage rates due to heavy 
immigration; and the destruction of great blocks of capital by a natural catastrophe or many others. We have 
already seen that none of these reasons is in itself sufficient to account for an excessive increase of investing 
activity, which necessarily engenders a subsequent crisis; but that they can lead to this result only through the 
increase in the means of credit which they inaugurate. (Hayek, 1929, 168). 
 
Even in this case, however, changes to preferences take place unilaterally. If, in the 
presence of a monetary rate, central banks do not realign the latter towards the equilibrium 
level in order also to encourage savers themselves to become more future-oriented by 
increasing saving amounts, the structure of preferences will remain disproportionate and the 
new inter-temporal production structure will reflect such an imbalance. In this case, therefore, 
expectations change before the intervention of central banks. In this case, it is not monetary 
manipulation that plays the key role capable of altering the system of preferences by dis-
coordinating plans and the structure of production. In the first situation, the crucial role is 
given by the manner and direction in which monetary expansion influence expectations. In 
the second case, on the other hand, expectations themselves divert the system away from 
equilibrium.  
Changing expectations, caused by (case 1) or the cause of (case 2) a monetary rate below 
its natural level, is – on closer inspection – a natural part of the entrepreneurial instinct 
emphasized by Schumpeter. The analysis of the entrepreneurial role (innovation) as a 
fundamental element in initiating an expansion cycle, implemented in an organic way by 
Schumpeter, is entirely coherent with our analysis. We are explicitly discussing the concept 
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of expectations: entrepreneurs see opportunities for profit and take advantage of them, i.e. 
they have positive expectations, or, otherwise, they are future-oriented and ready to make the 
production process more roundabout. Some are prepared to take risks on real innovations that 
can create a competitive advantage for them. Others by merely imitating on the wave of 
enthusiasm. Still others by launching poorly grounded economic initiatives. 
Let’s return now to our analysis and the disequilibrium between natural and monetary 
rates. The situation consideration therefore encourages the onset of major investments in 
production assets, or capital goods, whereby the economy becomes, in general, more capital-
intensive, i.e. the production period is extended21.  
The cardinal point of the theory is the difference created between entrepreneurial 
decisions and consumer choices22. In the situation in question, the funds available for 
investments initially do not correspond to the amount of savings. In fact, an artificially low 
monetary rate corresponds, on the capital market, to a higher availability of money because it 
translates into lower interest payable on investments.  
 
In general it is probably true to say that most investments are made in the expectation that the supply of 
capital will for some time continue at the present level. Or, in other words, entrepreneurs regard the present 
supply of capital and the present rate of interest as a symptom that approximately the same situation will 
continue to exist for some time. (Hayek, 1933, 142). 
 
What Hayek says is true, and the central role of expectations is resumed. Yet, all the 
more, the indicator on which entrepreneurs base their choices actually does not reflect any 
current propensity among consumers to save23. In this way, the proportion in which producers 
decide to differentiate production between products for the immediate future and those for the 
longer term (inter-temporal production structure) does not reflect the way in which 
consumers intend to divide their income between savings and consumption24. It is evident 
that sooner or later and disequilibrium in time preferences, which is reflected in an inter-
temporal production structure, will arise and the typical form will be the frustration of the 
expectations of one of the two groups25. 
So, while entrepreneurs invest in new processes for the production of capital goods, 
savers are frustrated in their desire to consume, because what they want is not being 
produced. The forced saving26 phenomenon thereby comes about, i.e. – as a consequence of 
the fact that production resources were diverted from sectors close to consumers – there is a 
gradual reduction in the production of consumer goods and therefore an involuntary 
limitation of consumption27. 
The entrepreneurial impetus towards new investments, on the other hand, initially 
involves an increase in raw material prices and consequently of the capital goods produced 
with them28. And the impetus must be considered as particularly violent in that the wave of 
the first innovative entrepreneurs is joined by the pressure of imitators described by 
Schumpeter, who grasp profit opportunities only in a second stage and attempt to benefit by 
following the ‘fashion’. On a closer look, imitative speculation waves are typical of every 
boom stage described in history. 
                                                          
21 Hayek (1931, 35-36).  
22 Hayek (1933, 143-148).  
23 Hayek (1933, 144).  
24 Hayek (1933, 144-145).  
25 Lachmann (1943, 69) and Hayek (1933, 145). 
26 See Hayek (1932). See also Huerta de Soto (1998:409-413).  
27 Kurz (2003:191) and Hayek (1933, 145-146). 
28 It is evident that this upsurge, during the expansion phase of the cycle, causes the prices of raw materials and 
capital goods to increase more than the prices of consumer goods (Hayek, 1939, 29).  
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At the same time, demand for labour increases, and is attracted towards the new 
investments, with relative wages: this leads in turn encourages demand for consumer goods 
and prices in this sector also increases. And it is therefore evident that the increase in non-
monetary income will not matched an increase in real incomes, because of the inflationary 
effect exerted by unsatisfied demand for consumer goods. 
 
This increased intensity of the demand for consumers’ goods need have no unfavourable effect on 
investment activity so long as the funds available for investment purposes are sufficiently increased by further 
credit expansion to claim, in the face of the increasing competition from the consumers’ goods industries, such 
increasing shares of the total available resources as are required to complete the new processes already under 
way. (Hayek, 1933, 147). 
 
Nevertheless, in order to be sustained, this process requires credit expansion without 
respite – which would bring about a cumulative increase in prices that sooner or later would 
exceed every limit. The conflict seems to be evident when demand for consumer goods 
exceeds in terms of absolute value the funds available for investment. At this point, the 
interest rate cannot but rise, frustrating demand for capital goods precisely when their price 
has also risen29. A considerable part of the new plant installed, designed to produce other 
capital goods, remains unused since the further investments required to complete production 
processes cannot be made30. As a result, in an advanced stage of the boom, growth in demand 
for consumer goods brings down demand for capital goods31. 
As we have seen, such a situation can may actually occur even without monetary 
manipulation but as a result of growing profit expectations which, since the monetary rate is 
not allowed to rebalance itself with the natural level, cannot find counterparts in realignment 
with the value of the savings. 
Inasmuch, the economy is unable to sustain production oriented over and above its 
possibilities. Sooner or later, it is realised that an increase in wages is cancelled by growing 
inflation. In addition, demand for capital goods runs out, taking with it the over-production in 
the particular sector and it is here where problems arise. Many economic initiatives set up 
through excessive reliance on credit cannot be completed, although the debts still have to be 
paid. Many companies have to be expelled from the system. Capital is scarce and banks raise 
interest rates. A period of adjustment and return to equilibrium begins, only it has aspects of a 
depression.  
 
4.2 The Sustainable Boom 
 
According to the traditional version of the ABCT, the wave dynamics typical of capitalism 
would be sustainable if, in typical situations of bright expectations, players were free to learn 
through interaction with each other and allow their choices to be judged on the market. 
Without the interference of a monetary rate, players would be forced to seek, on the market, 
to what extent their expectations are in line with those of other agents and therefore this 
would allow plans to be realised. The natural rate, although unknown as a magnitude, is 
dynamically given by time preferences, thereby generating a production structure in keeping 
with such preferences. The system would move and settle continuously. In this way, every 
change in the structure of production would be the adaptation to a change in time preferences, 
a dynamic adaptation: if profit expectations rise, pushing the natural rate upwards, the new 
production structure cannot begin to change until the new natural rate also convinces 
                                                          
29 As the rate of interest increases, the rate of profit declines (Hayek, 1939, 31).  
30 Hayek (1933, 148).  
31 Hayek (1939, 31). 
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consumers to change their attitudes; at the same time, it is likely that not all the intense 
demand for new investments will be ‘met’ from new savings, so that the natural rate will tend 
to stabilise at a lower point than the initial expansionist impetus generated by entrepreneurial 
expectations. Demand and supply mechanism will generate, through information 
transmission, the new price able to link expectations of investors and consumers.  
As can be seen, the situation is very different if there is a monetary rate capable of 
disguising the real strength of natural rate. And it is precisely the discrepancy generated 
between the natural and monetary value of the interest rate that tells us how long and painful 
cyclical dynamics will be32. 
In a system where there is no central bank, there is no monetary interest rate imposed by 
central authorities. In such as system, in which an effective free market would operate, there 
would simply be the natural equilibrium rate, capable of measuring the structure of time 
preferences. This means that price system as information transmission mechanism can 
actually work. What happens in the event of a unilateral modification on time preferences, 
such as an increase in the savings rate? This is the situation in which consumers become more 
future-oriented. It is thereby evident that a conflict arises between the time preferences of 
consumers and those of investors. Yet this also means that the equilibrium rate moves 
downwards, in an attempt also to orient the plans of entrepreneurs towards the future, who 
would therefore be encouraged to change the structure of the production process, starting 
with investments in more capital-intensive goods: the new lower interest rate is ‘informing’ 
investors that new resources are available for long-term investments. These investments will 
be financed precisely with the new savings. The new equilibrium rate, the only signal for 
players on the market, allows entrepreneurs to modify their expectations and plans; it informs 
them that new resources are available and that investments can be implemented profitably. 
The entrepreneurial instinct, typically Schumpeterian and also emphasized by Spiethoff, 
thereby allows the re-adaptation of expectations in order to harmonize time preferences. 
Consequently, without the interference of the central bank, the natural equilibrium rate (a 
price generated by the interaction of supply and demand and not imposed by central banks) 
allows the production structure to adapt to the new system of time preferences. The profit 
expectations of entrepreneurs, encouraged by the lower rate of interest, are not frustrated 
because they find a counterpart in the different attitude among consumers, who are now less 
oriented towards immediate consumption. In this case, the elongation of the productive 
structure, the expansion cycle, is sustainable because the free interaction of players does not 
encounter interference and plans can be adapted. This does not mean that, in the process of 
adaptation, errors are not encountered errors or that certain expectations will be frustrated. 
Preferences adaptation is a process that takes place in real time, not instantly. However, 
conditions exist whereby free transmission of information helps one to learn from mistakes 
and rearrange plans in line with the new situation. And the scenario itself will be continually 
changing. The re-adaptation process does not take place ‘once and for all’; it is a continuous 
and never tamed process. Nonetheless, it can be implemented in a balanced manner only if 
the natural rate, generate by the demand-supply interaction, the only signal (price) for the 
players, i.e. if divergent signals are not introduced from the outside which may wrongly guide 
decisions and make the discoordination of preferences perpetual, thereby preventing the free 
inter-temporal coordination mechanism of plans. 
In short, a growth path is generated when time preferences change on a global scale. And 
this is only possible, according to the Austrian theory, if the central element measuring time 
preferences – the interest rate – is left free to set itself on the market through the interaction 
                                                          
32 Hayek (1929, 183). 
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of individuals freely exerting their entrepreneurial function in the process of meeting their 
needs.  
 
4.3 Is Sustainable Boom Actually Sustainable? 
 
In all the cases analysed so far, we could notice how the boom is always generated by a 
moving toward the future of the intertemporal structure of the preferences. Changing 
expectations can occur from the consumer side or from the entrepreneur side. What matters is 
that the result is a lengthening of the structure of the production: more roundabout production 
processes are started by the entrepreneurs. These new investment are what are called 
innovations in the Schumpeterian approach; they generate development33, or the 
«spontaneous and discontinuous changes in the channel of the circular flow and [the] 
disturbances of the centre of equilibrium»34.  
It is time to implant some Schumpeterian elements into the theory we sketched so far. 
This will help us to understand why economic crises are unavoidable. Let us assume that we 
set off from a situation of perfect static equilibrium in which assumptions of perfect 
competition, constant population, lack of savings and everything needed to meet the 
requirements of the circular flow35 (Schumpeter calls such a situation of equilibrium the 
‘theoretical standard’36) hold true. It is also assumed that, in the capitalist society model, 
there will always be the possibility of new combinations and people capable and willing to 
implement them (their motivation is the prospect of profit). 
 
Some people, then, conceive and work out with varying promptness plans for innovations associated with 
varying anticipations of profits, and set about struggling with the obstacles incident to doing a new and 
unfamiliar thing  […] we suppose that he founds a new firm, constructs a new plant, and orders new equipment 
from existing firms. The requisite funds he borrows from a bank. On the balance acquired by so doing he draws, 
either in order to hand the checks to other people who furnish him with goods and services, or in order to get 
currency with which to pay for these supplies. […] he withdraws, by his bids for producers’ goods, the 
quantities of them he needs from the uses which they served before.  
Then other entrepreneurs follow, after them still others in increasing number, in the path of innovation, 
which becomes progressively smoothed for successors by accumulating experience and vanishing obstacles. 
(Schumpeter, 1964, 133-134).  
 
What we note from the foregoing excerpt? Firstly, Schumpeter assumes that 
entrepreneurs immediately spend their deposits, except for a minimum reserve. Secondly, 
since there are no unused resources at the outset (given the circular flow hypothesis), the 
prices of production factors will increase, as well as monetary incomes and the interest rate. 
Thirdly, revenue will also increase, in line with the expenditure by entrepreneurs in 
investment goods, alongside those of workers, momentarily employed with higher wages, and 
those of everyone receiving all those higher payments37. However, up to this point, it is 
legitimate to assume that there has not yet been an increase in production38. This is what 
happens until the plant of the first entrepreneur begins to run39. 
 
                                                          
33 Development in Schumpeter’s point of view must be absolutely distinguished from growth, which can also 
occur even a stationary condition, in being distinguished by the absence of structural changes. In this regard, see 
also Lachmann (1940, 271).  
34 Schumpeter (1911, 65) 
35 Schumpeter (1964, 132-133).  
36 Schumpeter (1964, 29-38).  
37 Schumpeter (1964, 134).  
38 Schumpeter (1964, 135).  
39 Schumpeter (1964, 136). 
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Then the scene begins to change. The new commodities—let us say, new consumers’ goods—flow into the 
market. They are, since everything turns out according to expectation, readily taken up at exactly those prices at 
which the entrepreneur expected to sell them. […] A stream of receipts will hence flow into the entrepreneur’s 
account, at a rate sufficient to repay, during the lifetime of the plant and equipment originally acquired, the total 
debt incurred plus interest, and to leave a profit for the entrepreneur. […] the new firms, getting successively 
into working order and throwing their products into the market of consumers’ goods, increase the total output of 
consumers’ goods […]. (Schumpeter, 1964, 136). 
 
Such new goods, according to Schumpeter, enter the market too quickly to be absorbed 
smoothly. In particular, the old enterprises and the pursuers have several possible scenarios 
before them, but there is no fixed rule: some become part of the new scenarios, others close 
because they are unable to adapt, others still seek rationalization40. However, the competitive 
advantage of the driving company tends to fade, since, as the products progressively come on 
to the market and the debt repayments quantitatively increase in importance, entrepreneurial 
activity tends to diminish to the point of disappearing altogether41. As soon as entrepreneurial 
impetus loses steam, pulling the system away from its previous area of equilibrium, the 
system embarks on a struggle towards a new equilibrium. The initial outline of a cyclic 
pattern can be seen42. 
 
Each of those two phases is characterized by a definite succession of phenomena. The reader need only 
recall what they are in order to make the discovery that they are precisely the phenomenon which he associates 
with “prosperity” and “recession”: our model reproduces, by its mere working, that very sequence of events 
which we observe in the course of those fluctuations in economic life which have come to be called business 
cycles and which, translated into the language of diagrams, present the picture of an undulating or wavelike 
movement in absolute figures or rates of change. (Schumpeter, 1964, 142).  
 
The following is the reasoning that leads to the second approximation of the cycle. If 
innovations are incorporated into new plant and equipment, spending on consumer goods will 
increase at least as fast as spending on capital goods. Both will expand starting from those 
points in the system where they exerted the first impact and will create that set of economic 
situations which we call prosperity. Two phenomena arise here: firstly, old businesses will 
react to this situation and, second, a number of them will speculate on it. Those who seek to 
take advantage of the situation, by speculating, act on the assumption that the rates of change 
they observe will continue indefinitely; such an attitude anticipates prosperity, causing a 
boom43. At this point, transactions join the picture that, in order to become possible, assume 
an expected or effective increase in prices. This is how, in the cyclic process, a secondary 
wave comes into play, the effects of which overlap those of the primary wave44. The 
outcomes of the new wave are also more visible than the first wave. 
Even in secondary prosperity, the break is induced by a turning point in the underlying 
process. Any state of prosperity, however ideally limited to essential primary processes, 
involves a period of failures that, in addition to eliminating enterprises that are obsolete 
beyond any chance of re-adaptation, also gives rise to a painful readjustment process of 
prices, quantities and values, as the framework of a new system of equilibrium progressively 
emerges45. Secondary prosperity even sees risky, fraudulent or in any case unlucky initiatives 
take shape that are unable to cope with the recession (entrepreneurs defined as imitators and 
speculators, who simply follow the situation of change). The speculative position involves 
                                                          
40 Schumpeter (1964, 137-138).  
41 Schumpeter (1964, 138).  
42 Schumpeter (1964, 142). 
43 Schumpeter (1964, 150).  
44 Schumpeter (1964, 151).  
45 Schumpeter (1964, 153-154).  
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many unsustainable elements, which even a minimal deterioration of the value of collateral 
elements will cause to fall. Inasmuch, a great deal of the day-to-day business and investments 
will suffer a loss as soon as prices fall, as they undoubtedly will in view of the primary 
process. A portion of the debt structure will also collapse. If panic and crisis prevail in this 
case, further adjustments become necessary: values fall and every fall brings with it yet 
another fall. For a certain time, the pessimistic expectation may play a decisive role, even if it 
subsequently does not hold up unless substantiated by objective factors46. 
A cyclical pattern with four stages is consequently outlined (remember that first 
approximation only included prosperity and recession): prosperity, recession, depression, 
recovery. 
For our purposes, it is vital to emphasise the characteristic element of secondary 
prosperity: imitations and their role in further swelling the growth process. As acknowledged 
by Lachmann (1986, 15), perhaps the most Schumpeterian of the Austrians, a «competitive 
process taking place within the market for a good consists typically of two phases, and in it 
the factors of innovation and imitation may be isolated as iterative elements»47. The 
expansion stage of the cycle is always characterised by the elongation of the production 
structure – an elongation that occurs because of investments usually associated with a 
specific sector of assets, i.e. the one linked with growing profit expectations, in turn 
stimulated by a certain kind of credit policy or change in time preferences. The success of the 
first investments, when the liquidation process is still not on the horizon, modifies 
information and the expectations of many other subjects, attracting imitators who additional 
investments, usually financed by credit, contribute towards intensifying the magnitude of 
expansion. 
 
 
5. THE INEVITABILITY OF CRISES. THE NATURAL CYCLE 
 
Now we shall attempt to demonstrate how crisis is a consequence of all stages of growth 
and how sustainable and artificial booms are not distinguished by the onset of depression but 
by its intensity and duration. Inasmuch, in our view, even in the case of ‘healthy’ expansion, 
the growth stage will be followed by a process of resettlement (crisis). This is because – even 
for sustainable development – positive profit expectations, once the cycle has been set in 
motion, facilitate the appearance of speculative-imitative initiatives that, at a given point, 
must be liquidated in order to ‘normalize’ the progress of growth. What distinguishes 
sustainable development from an artificial boom is not the emergence of a crisis; the 
difference lies in the nature of the crisis and its intensity.  
The crucial elements in our analysis, therefore, are expectations and the imitative process. 
As we have seen, Hayek (1929, 147) recognised the central role of expectations as early as 
1929, when he emphasised profit expectations as the driving force behind entrepreneurial 
preferences, with the possibility of entrepreneurs becoming more future-oriented and thus 
shifting the equilibrium interest rate upwards.    
Profit expectations are a key element in both the Hayekian vision of sustainable growth 
and in the opposite case. We will use them to describe the emergence of imitations and 
secondary expansion, then followed by a crisis. It is now time to see how the so-called 
sustainable growth in Austrian theory turned, in our view, into the natural cycle48.  
In the ideal situation where the monetary rate does not exist (nor the Central Bank), a 
lengthening of the production period, with the emergence of capital-intensive investment 
                                                          
46 Schumpeter (1964, 154). 
47 See also Lewin (1997, 15). 
48 See Ferlito (2014a). 
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processes, is in fact possible when either consumers or investors become more future-
oriented. If consumers are the first to change their preferences, this will take the form of 
growing savings followed by a decrease in the natural rate of interest, in order to attract 
investors to use those resources for more roundabout investments. If, on the other hand, 
entrepreneurs are the first to push towards lengthening of the production structure, the natural 
rate will rise in order to attract savers in the same direction, thereby providing necessary 
resources for new investments. In both cases, the natural rate is driven by a change in the 
structure of temporal preferences, in turn generated by different expectations. What follows is 
a process of sustainable development.  
The role of business expectations in generating capital-intensive investments is also 
emphasized by Schumpeter, as is already well-known. We also saw earlier how Hayek refers 
explicitly to Schumpeter in highlighting the innovative and investment process that follows 
positive profit expectations. In this process of expansion, in accordance with the traditional 
version of the ABCT, the aspects needed to generate a crisis do not arise. 
However, observation of reality leads us to emphasize, following Schumpeter and 
Lachmann, that the first wave of investments it is always followed by a secondary wave of 
imitations and speculations. As analysed above, the pace of economic growth becomes 
particularly sustained when the primary wave of entrepreneurial investments is joined by a 
stage of secondary growth encouraged by the copy-cat instincts of imitators in search of 
profit and driven by ‘fashion’. Why are imitations inevitable? This is what we have already 
seen as regards Lachmann’s vision of capitalist development characterized by innovation and 
imitation. Keeping faith with subjectivism and the role of expectations, it is easy to imagine 
how the success of entrepreneurial initiatives is readily followed by imitators looking for 
success within what at first sight always seems to be a period of growth destined never to 
end. The primary stage of growth is characterised by investment set in motion by a limited 
number of entrepreneurs – those who are able to seize opportunities that go unnoticed by 
most people and therefore the first to change their expectations (Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs). The secondary stage is characterized by the appearance on the market of an 
exceptional number of imitators, driven by profit expectations arising from observing the 
ongoing of the boom set in motion by the first innovative entrepreneurs.  
This is how we identified the first two stages in our natural cycle: primary expansion, 
generated by a change in the structure of time preferences and expectations (the system 
becomes more future-oriented), and secondary expansion characterized by imitative 
investments.  
If, therefore, the reality of imitative speculations cannot be eliminated, it outlines the 
character of the growth process by emphasizing development above the initially imagined 
level. As for the primary wave of investments, the second wave is also generated by profit 
expectations, particularly the expectation that the current situation will not change 
(Schumpeter, 1939, 145). From a quantitative point of view, moreover, imitation (secondary) 
investments might even be greater than the first cycle of investments since they involve a 
larger number of individuals, whose expectations are ‘over-excited’ by the boom 
(Schumpeter, 1939, 146). These secondary investments will have to be liquidated through an 
adjustment crisis, as we shall attempt to demonstrate. 
The fact that secondary wave investments necessarily bring about their liquidation, by 
generating a crisis, even if for boom not induced artificially by discoordination between 
natural and monetary rates, apparently seems to be at odds with the traditional version of the 
Austrian theory, which does not admit the crisis whenever such discoordination is not at the 
base of the growth process. We believe, on the other hand, that – while not denying the 
validity of the Austrian approach – this vision should be superseded. 
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Let’s summarise the appearance of primary expansion characterising our natural cycle. 
When, given positive profit expectations, entrepreneurs become more future-oriented, the 
natural rate of interest grows, in order to move consumer preferences in the same direction, 
encouraging them to save more and thereby generate resources to meet increased demand for 
loanable funds by investors. The mirror-image situation arises when consumer expectations 
change in a more future-oriented direction; in this case, the natural rate of interest falls, 
informing entrepreneurs that new resources are available for investments in the longer term. 
Both situations, to use ‘Austrian’ jargon, give rise to a sustainable boom. 
According to this schema, given that the lengthening of the production structure derives 
from a change in time preferences and market operators are not deceived by a monetary rate 
inconsistent with the natural rate, current investments will always find available resources to 
complete the business projects launched. This is precisely because, without the interference 
of political-monetary authorities, market operators are free to ‘reveal themselves’ to each 
other and readjust their scheme of preferences in conformity with the modified situation.  
However, we have the distinct impression that this view does not take a fundamental fact 
into account: the rhythm of investments in real time. The Schumpeterian distinction between 
primary wave and secondary wave investments in this regard becomes critical. In fact, the 
initial increase in investments followed by a change in the structure of time preferences does 
not seem to generate any problem. Whether savings grow or the natural interest rate increases 
because of profit expectations, the timing of the onset of business ventures is necessarily 
dictated by the realignment of preferences. When savings increase, in fact, the problem does 
not arise precisely because the increased resources are the first cause of the reduction of the 
natural rate and the lengthening of the productive structure its consequence. All the more, if 
there is increased demand for loanable funds, new resources for investment will not be 
available until consumers decide to increase their propensity to save, that is, until the 
intentions of the two groups of players re-align again. 
The matter changes when second wave of investments comes into play, generated by the 
imitative process. It is first and foremost a natural fact, intrinsic to the boom, regardless of its 
type. Indeed, as Schumpeter emphasized, innovation is never generated as a mass 
phenomenon; on the contrary, it arises through the initiative of certain ‘elect spirits’ – 
entrepreneurs – whose essence lies precisely in being able to grasp profit opportunities where 
others fail to see them49. Subsequently, in any case, when the expansion phenomenon is  
already set in motion – when an opportunity for profit has already been identified and 
grasped by some people – the prospect of grabbing a slice of the cake becomes tempting for 
many (the role of expectations). Not for those who have seized the opportunity and, having 
begun to invest, are now on the way towards reaping their reward; but for those who were 
bystanders and are now seeking to take part in the boom stage (with a time lapse compared to 
the primary wave).  
What form does the imitative desire take? It generates new demand for loanable funds in 
order to insert a more roundabout production process into the expansive cycle. This means an 
attempt to extend the expansion process temporarily, thereby also increasing the degree of 
uncertainty. 
 
More time taken implies more things can happen – providing the possibility of greater productivity but also 
greater uncertainty. Since the value of higher order (capital) goods depends on the prospective value of the 
consumer goods they are expected to produce, the elapse of time, and with it the arrival of unexpected events, 
implies that some production plans are bound to be disappointed and thus the value of specific capital goods will 
be affected. (Lewin, 2005, 151). 
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And this brings us to the second stage of the natural cycle: secondary expansion. Pressure 
on demand for loanable funds forces the natural interest rate to rise further, in order to attract 
new savings to finance these investments. And this is where the role of banks joins the game 
to a very similar extent to that described by Schumpeter. Initially, demand for loanable funds 
cannot be met because preferences have not yet realigned with the new interest rate level and 
it is even likely that such a realignment does not actually take place. 
However, the positive sentiment, the positive profit expectations, that become 
‘incandescent’ at the end of the primary expansion stage, also plays a role as regards the 
action of banks. In fact, precisely because of what happens during expansion, it is highly 
likely that banks make available ‘virtual funds’ that are not backed up by real savings (as is 
the case during the first wave of investments), driven by expectations that the adaptation of 
consumer preferences (further savings) cannot but occur, precisely because of the enthusiasm 
generated by the boom.  
On the other hand, it is more than likely that the long-awaited realignment does not come 
about. Even though the natural rate may increase, in view of the profit expectations arising 
from the request for second wave of investments (imitative), the likelihood that savings may 
increase is limited by two factors. The most obvious one is of course that consumers must 
also consume, hence their capacity for saving (and realignment) is objectively limited by the 
necessity to consume. In addition, in all likelihood, consumers will also be influenced by the 
general enthusiasm of the boom stage and consequently change their preferences in the 
opposite direction, i.e. by increasing their propensity for consumption. This is all the more 
true given the fact that real wages grow during the boom in order to attract workers into the 
new investment areas or to employ formerly unemployed workers. As in the conventional 
Austrian explanation, this leads to pressure in demand for consumer goods, with an initial 
phenomenon of forced savings and the production structure subsequent need to return to 
present-oriented projects (consumer goods). At this point, the growth of price and wages and 
the pressure on prices goods of consumer goods brings about what Hayek called the ‘Ricardo 
effect’: it helps explain why a prolonged boom stage driven by monetary expansion is likely 
to turn into a crisis.  
 
[I]f the credit expansion boom does not come to an end sooner for some other reason, it must come to an 
end when consumer product prices advance ahead of wage and resource prices. The Ricardo effect lowers real 
wages and encourages a shift toward labor-intensive methods of production. A lowering of the real wage of 
labor makes short-term (labor-intensive) projects appear to be more profitable than long-term (capital-intensive) 
methods of production. The Ricardo effect may account for the sudden wave of bankruptcies among the large 
fixed-investment projects that occurred toward the end of many nineteenth-century business cycles. (Moss, 
2005, 8-9).  
 
So, while the first wave of investments can complete its cycle because of the real 
existence of prior and stable funds (without which the expansion cycle would not even have 
started), the second wave will be frustrated by a change in consumer preferences and a 
banking policy influenced by expectations of profit.  
The difference between sustainable growth and artificial boom, therefore, lies in the 
following fact: where the ‘defective’ cycle is triggered by a discoordination between a natural 
rate and a monetary rate controlled by the monetary authorities, in general many of the 
roundabout processes of production end up being frustrated by the onset of the Hayekian 
phenomenon of scarcity of capital, as described above. On the other hand, for a sustainable 
boom (natural cycle) generated by a change in expectations, it is only the inevitable wave of 
speculative-imitative investment, backed up by a banking policy influenced by a positive 
sentiment, which itself will later be frustrated, wherein a crisis will be the necessary action to 
liquidate such faulty initiatives.  
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What will follow in the latter case will be a crisis (third stage of the natural cycle) but 
limited in terms of intensity, duration and the number of sectors involved. We could even 
define it as a transitory readjustment crisis, which does not cancel the beneficial effects of the 
previous boom but merely liquidates business ventures launched for speculative-imitative 
purposes. What will not follow, instead, is a fourth stage, the depression, typical of the 
‘defective’ cycle.  
 
 
6. OUR THEORY AND THE CURRENT CRISIS 
 
The crisis emerged in the United States and Europe in 2007 can be described by our 
theory; first and above all it falls into the category of what we described as unsustainable 
boom: the production structure becomes more roundabout not because of a modification in 
the intertemporal structure of preferences, but because of credit policy sending wrong price 
signals to entrepreneurs. 
The quantitative easing igniting the typical Misesian artificial boom is strongly supported 
by empirical evidences50. Table 1 in Ferlito (2010, 40-41) shows a distortive monetary policy 
starting to happen in 2001. From the peak reached in 2000 (6.4%), the Fed began to lower the 
official interest rate. We remember that at that time America was facing the difficulties 
created by the end of the new economy bubble and, later in 2001, by the 9/11 attack. Such an 
expansionary policy lasted until mid-2004 (i=1%), when, because of an inflationary 
dynamics, Fed started to move in the opposite direction. However, interest rates remained 
below levels suggested by the Tailor rule until 2006. As argued in Taylor (2009), «Fed kept 
the funds rate below that suggested by the eponymous Taylor rule for 4 years»51. Figure 1 
summarizes the situation. 
 
Figure 1: Actual Federal funds rate vs. counterfactual Federal funds rate (Koppl, 2014, 23). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
50 See, in particular, Koppl (2014, 18-40), Ahrend (2010), Young (2012) and Bocutoğlu and Ekinci (2010). 
51 Young (2012, 79). «The rule advised the Fed to target the short-term interest rate (the federal funds rate). This 
rate ‘should be one-and-a-half times the inflation rate plus one-half times the GDP gap plus one’ (Taylor 2009, 
location 519). In this case, the ‘GDP gap’ is just ‘the percent deviation of real GDP from a target’, which he takes 
to be the trend of 2.2 per cent per year growth that held between 1984 and 1992» (Koppl, 2014, 20). Detailed 
graph comparing actual rates and ‘Taylor’ rates country by country can be found in Ahrend (2010, 6-7).  
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The trend inverted again on July 2007 (i=5.25%), after the emergence of the subprime 
crisis. Since then, official interest rate never stopped to move downward, as it is well known. 
A similar trend is observable in the ECB interest rate policy, with some time lag and less 
drastic movements52. The expansionary trend of the monetary policy is supported by statistics 
regarding M3 and M053 and particularly astonishing is the 106% jump in M0 in the USA in 
2009. Data on American bank credit confirms the easy money trend of the pre-crisis years. 
According to statistics published by the Federal Reserve of St. Louis, the USA banking system 
was lending 5,000 billions USD in 2000 and more than double in 200854. Moreover, M2 
recorded a 32% growth between 2002-200655.  
As it is well known, most of the new credit was real-estate credit, financing a bubble in 
the housing market. 
 
Figure 2: Real-estate/Bus Loans Credits in the United States (%) (Bocutoğlu and Ekinci, 2010, 12). 
 
 
 
As stated in Taylor (2009), the  
 
effects of the boom and bust were amplified by several complicating factors including the use of subprime 
and adjustable-rate mortgages, which led to excessive risk taking. There is also evidence the excessive risk 
taking was encouraged by the excessively low interest rates. Delinquency rates and foreclosure rates are 
inversely related to housing price inflation. These rates declined rapidly during the years housing prices rose 
rapidly, likely throwing mortgage-underwriting programs off track and misleading many people56. 
 
Figure 3: Total derivative market (TDM) (in trillions) (Bocutoğlu and Ekinci, 2010, 15). 
 
                                                          
52 Ferlito (2010, 40-41). 
53 Ferlito (2010, 43). 
54 Ferlito (2010, 44). 
55 Koppl (2014, 24). 
56 Quoted in Bocutoğlu and Ekinci (2010, 15). 
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The effect of the monetary expansion is visible on the GDP trend57. Europe and USA 
experienced good rates of GDP growth and a moderate reduction in unemployment between 
2002 and 2006. However, the trend proved to be unsustainable, because driven by monetary 
expansions and not by a change in the intertemporal structure of preferences. 
 
Table 1: Unemployment Rate, Real GDP Growth, and the Federal Funds Rate: 2002–2009 (Young, 
2012, 80). 
 
 
Now that we observed the monetary expansion and the effect on the GDP, it is necessary 
to check how the production structure and the price dynamics were distorted by such 
expansion. In the USA, investment in capital goods touched a lower peak in 2002, following 
the 2001 crisis: around 47 billions USD. Following the monetary expansions, the amount 
started to rise again to reach 68 billions USD in 2007, when a new downward movement 
began to go back to 50 billions USD in 2009. The trend is confirmed by the price dynamics: 
moving upward between 2003 and 2007, starting to fall down after the emergence of the new 
crisis58.  
As it is well known, the bubble regarded in particular the property industry, so we should 
be able to observe an upward trend in prices of property. This is, indeed, the case: while 
property prices increased by 59% from the beginning of 1997 to the end of 2001, the rise in 
housing prices was 83% in the period from December 2001 to June 200659. 
 
Figure 4: Case-Schiller Home Price Index (CS) and effective federal-funds rates (FF) 
                                                          
57 Ferlito (2010, 46). 
58 Ferlito (2010, 45). 
59 Bocutoğlu and Ekinci (2010, 10). 
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for the period 1987–2010 (Bocutoğlu and Ekinci, 2010, 10). 
 
 
 
The relation between monetary expansion and housing prices is empirically verified also 
for a panel of countries by Ahrend (2010, 14). 
 
 
 
In order to understand the modifications that the production structure experienced 
because of the credit expansion, we shall refer to the empirical evaluation done by Young 
(2012, 81-90). In fact, quite uniquely, the author tries to give a quantitative measure of the 
level of what the ABCT calls ‘roundaboutness’: because of the monetary expansion, 
entrepreneurs try to expand early production stages. However, and here we can find the 
reason why the boom cannot be sustained, consumers do become more future-oriented, they 
do not change their time preferences and therefore they are still demanding the same 
consumption goods. Entrepreneurs try to make longer the production structure, while 
consumers want to preserve it as it is. 
Young (2012) uses the total industry output requirement (TIOR) in order to measure the 
roundaboutness of the production processes. 
 
The TIOR is, for a given industry, “the output required, both directly and indirectly, by each [other] industry 
to deliver a dollar of final demand of industry output to final users.” In other words, it is the amount of gross 
output from other industries that must be produced per dollar of a given industry’s output: the ratio of total gross 
output to final output for an industry. This ratio will be greater than unity by definition. The critical assumption 
of this study is that an industry’s roundaboutness is proportional to its TIOR. (Young, 2012, 81-82). 
 
Typical, Austrian economics considers production process as divided into a series of 
stages, i=1, …, N. The initial amount of input is called X0. At each stage, the gross output will 
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be Xi, where Xi = Xi-1 + (value-added)i. The final gross output XN is XN = ∑ 𝑋i𝑁𝑖=1 . At each 
stage, TIOR = X/XN. Young (2012, 82-83) summarizes this in the following table. 
 
Table 2: Value-Added, Gross Output, and TIOR (Young, 2012, 83). 
 
 
An economic system becoming more roundabout is, i.e., an economic system moving 
from having four stages and therefore producing 474 with a TIOR of 3.56 to recording five 
stages and producing 610 with TIOR=4.17. Young (2012) collected TIORs for 65 industries for 
the years 1998 to 2009. With such data a measure of roundaboutness was built, weighing 
each industry using the shares of total value added. The aim was to check if the production 
structure changed during the period 2002-2006. Results are shown in the below figure. 
 
Figure 5: US Aggregate Roundaboutness and Federal Funds Rate, 1998–2009 (Young, 2012, 85).  
 
 
 
Figure 5 shows that 
 
[h]eading into the 2001 recession, the aggregate TIOR was falling. Then in 2002, following the recession, 
and precisely when the Federal Reserve embarked on an exceedingly expansionary policy (by the Taylor rule 
standard), the aggregate TIOR began to expand at an increasing rate. The TIOR levels off and then rises only 
slowly following the Fed’s (belated) increases of the funds rate starting in 2004. 
The 2007 to 2009 recession was then characterized by a remarkable decrease in the aggregate TIOR, 
indicating a contraction of the time structure of production. While the aggregate TIOR low following the 2001 
recession was just under 1.74, the last observation available for the TIOR (in 2009) is about 1.71. (Young, 2012, 
85). 
 
Subsequently, Young (2012, 86-87) divided industries in two group, the more roundabout 
(MR) and the less roundabout (LR). According to the theory described in section 4, we 
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should expect that MR and LR registered both a growth during the artificial boom (2002-
2006). But we should expect that MR industries grew earlier and at a heavier pace, while the 
LR industries peak should arrive later. At the same time, the growth for MR industries should 
turn negative earlier. This is what indeed happened. 
 
While coming out 2002 the (average) growth rates of value-added in both MR and LR industry subsamples 
increased, value-added growth in MR industries accelerated markedly, peaking at about 11.7 percent in 2004. 
Value-added growth in LR industries also accelerated during the boom, but the acceleration was more muted 
and peaked later (at about 7.5 percent in 2005). MR value-added growth also contracted relatively early, turning 
negative in 2007. LR value-added growth remained positive until 2009. Notably, the timing of the peak in MR 
value-added growth coincided with the Fed beginning to increase the federal funds rate in 2004. (Young, 2012, 
86). 
 
Figure 6: Value-Added Growth Rates for Most and Least Roundabout Industries; Federal Funds 
Rate, 1998–2009 (Young, 2012, 88. 
 
 
Such a dynamics should find a counterpart in the inflationary trend. If the theory is 
consistent, we expect to find inflation for MR industries during the ‘hottest’ years of the 
boom (2002-2004). On the contrary, price dynamics for LR industries should manifest less 
intense variations. Again, such conclusions are confirmed by Young statistical investigation. 
 
The LR (average) industry inflation rate was relatively stable from 1999 to 2009. A slow acceleration 
(consistent with ABCT) did occur from 2002 through 2006, followed by a subsequent decrease in PPI inflation. 
For the MR industries a remarkable acceleration in PPI inflation (peaking in 2004) accompanied the 
corresponding nominal value-added boom (Fig. 3). Moreover, the MR inflation rate in 2004 was greater than the 
value-added growth rate (15.6 percent versus 11.7 percent). (Young, 2012, 88). 
 
Figure 7: PPI Average Inflation Rates for Most and Least Roundabout Industries, 1998–2009 
(Young, 2012, 89). 
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Finally, we shall try to distinguish what happened with the unsustainable boom and what 
could had happened in case of natural cycle. Or, better, we should look at the two stages of 
the growth path (primary and secondary waves), which, according to our vision, are 
experienced in both cases. And, instead, we should identify crisis and depression in the 
unsustainable case, while in case of natural cycle the downturn movement should have been 
less severe. In fact, what we claimed, following Schumpeter, is that all the booms (ignited by 
monetary easing or by more future-oriented expectations) are characterized by two stages: the 
initial growth and the speculative wave (fever). In the case of inflation induced boom we 
should then experience a longer a deeper crisis than in case of natural cycle. 
Eurostat and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis support our idea that the boom should be 
divided into two stages. 
  
Table 3: GDP USA (trillions of USD) and EU-15 (billions of EURO), 2001-2014 (Federal Reserve bank of St. 
Louis and Eurostat).  
Date GDP USA % Δ on Y-1 GDP EU-15 % Δ on Y-1 
2001-01-01 USD 10,508.10  EUR   9,082,627.20  
2002-01-01 USD 10,834.40 3.11% EUR   9,418,817.40 3.70% 
2003-01-01 USD 11,230.10 3.65% EUR   9,750,628.90 3.52% 
2004-01-01 USD 11,988.40 6.75% EUR   9,922,512.10 1.76% 
2005-01-01 USD 12,813.70 6.88% EUR  10,395,107.00 4.76% 
2006-01-01 USD 13,648.90 6.52% EUR  10,782,958.70 3.73% 
2007-01-01 USD 14,233.20 4.28% EUR  11,361,207.80 5.36% 
2008-01-01 USD 14,668.40 3.06% EUR  11,964,559.40 5.31% 
2009-01-01 USD 14,383.90 -1.94% EUR  11,925,489.60 -0.33% 
2010-01-01 USD 14,681.10 2.07% EUR  11,303,488.80 -5.22% 
2011-01-01 USD 15,238.40 3.80% EUR  11,777,522.40 4.19% 
2012-01-01 USD 15,973.90 4.83% EUR  12,113,108.60 2.85% 
2013-01-01 USD 16,440.70 2.92% EUR  12,347,726.10 1.94% 
2014-01-01 USD 16,984.30 3.31% EUR  12,425,758.80 0.63% 
2015-01-01 USD 17,649.30 3.92% EUR  12,795,712.20 2.98% 
 
Table 3 shows that the boom started, both in America and in Europe, with growth rates 
between 3 and 4%. It is only in 2004 that the USA economy starts to grow at an annual pace 
close to 7%. In Europe it is visible the same dynamics, though slightly later and at a lower 
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pace. Growth remains around 4% for the greatest part of the expansion, while we can talk of 
a secondary and speculative fever only in 2006 and 2007. What is important is that in both 
continents we can clearly distinguish a moment of initial expansion (first wave of the boom), 
stably running at around 3.5% a year, and a strong secondary boom with rates well above 
6.5% in the USA and around 5.5% in the EU. On the Western side of the Atlantic Ocean the 
first wave of expansion lasted only two years to give way to an early secondary wave, lasting 
three years, which gradually turn off (two years) before reaching the crisis. In Europe, 
instead, we see a primary wave lasting five years, before the entering of the secondary boom 
(two years) which ended directly into the crisis.  
Such dynamics is confirmed by data on house pricing in the USA.  
 
Table 4: HPI indexes, USA, 2001-2015.   
Year  Quarter Purchase-Only Index  
(1991Q1=100) 
HPI 
% Change Over  
Previous 4 Quarters 
HPI 
% Change Over  
Previous Quarter 
2001  1  146.57  7.66% 2.46% 
2001  2  150.16  7.71% 1.68% 
2001  3  152.68  7.43% 1.55% 
2001  4  153.98  7.11% 1.24% 
2002  1  156.13  6.04% 1.44% 
2002  2  160.37  6.06% 1.69% 
2002  3  163.75  6.51% 1.99% 
2002  4  165.80  6.70% 1.42% 
2003  1  168.18  6.47% 1.22% 
2003  2  172.46  5.97% 1.22% 
2003  3  176.21  5.49% 1.53% 
2003  4  178.82  6.95% 2.82% 
2004  1  182.18  7.31% 1.56% 
2004  2  188.58  8.60% 2.43% 
2004  3  193.81  11.05% 3.82% 
2004  4  196.96  10.30% 2.13% 
2005  1  201.10  11.11% 2.30% 
2005  2  208.64  11.94% 3.19% 
2005  3  214.39  11.06% 3.01% 
2005  4  217.04  11.21% 2.26% 
2006  1  219.51  10.44% 1.60% 
2006  2  223.77  8.12% 1.03% 
2006  3  224.52  5.84% 0.84% 
2006  4  223.56  4.55% 1.02% 
2007  1  224.02  3.30% 0.38% 
2007  2  226.56  2.18% -0.06% 
2007  3  223.97  0.22% -1.10% 
2007  4  218.00  -1.07% -0.28% 
2008  1  211.79  -2.12% -0.69% 
2008  2  209.16  -4.48% -2.47% 
2008  3  204.25  -6.42% -3.11% 
2008  4  196.23  -6.99% -0.89% 
2009  1  194.09  -5.65% 0.75% 
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2009  2  194.64  -5.82% -2.65% 
2009  3  193.81  -5.37% -2.65% 
2009  4  191.69  -5.20% -0.71% 
2010  1  188.13  -7.03% -1.20% 
2010  2  190.92  -5.34% -0.88% 
2010  3  187.91  -1.82% 0.97% 
2010  4  183.85  -1.82% -0.71% 
2011  1  178.08  -3.37% -2.76% 
2011  2  180.57  -4.15% -1.68% 
2011  3  181.65  -4.32% 0.80% 
2011  4  179.67  -3.18% 0.47% 
2012  1  179.02  -1.46% -1.03% 
2012  2  186.34  -0.13% -0.35% 
2012  3  188.65  0.36% 1.30% 
2012  4  189.10  0.71% 0.82% 
2013  1  191.35  2.30% 0.53% 
2013  2  200.08  4.32% 1.62% 
2013  3  203.92  4.69% 1.66% 
2013  4  203.32  4.88% 1.00% 
2014  1  204.34  5.30% 0.93% 
2014  2  211.18  5.87% 2.17% 
2014  3  213.65  5.76% 1.54% 
2014  4  213.58  5.63% 0.87% 
2015  1  215.10  5.56% 0.87% 
2015  2  222.58  5.25% 1.86% 
 
Table 4 testifies that because of the 2001 new economy crisis houses prices slowed their 
growth path in 2002 and 2003, recording an annual average growth around 6%. It is from 
2004 that we can see, accordingly to what we could expect, the rate of annual growth speed 
up to 10-12%. As for the GDP we observe a moderation in 2007, after three speculative years 
(2004-2006). Toward the end of 2007, with the emergence of the economic crisis, housing 
prices starts gradually to fall down, to start to rise again in the third quarter of 2012. 
Our considerations about the existence of two waves in the boom is therefore confirmed 
by GDP and housing prices dynamics. It is more difficult, instead, to reach definitive 
conclusions regarding the recession. When would the downturn stop if instead of an 
artificially ignited expansion we had experienced a growth driven by rising profit 
expectations met by a growing saving rate? It is hard to say, in particular because QEs did not 
allow the deflationary process to take the necessary course in order to definitely clear the 
field from the results of malinvestments60. GDP data do not adequately testify the intensity of 
the crisis and the structural process of readjustment toward a new production structure 
consistent with the intentions of consumers and investors. However, we can observe that the 
years after the crisis are characterized by slow growth and, moreover, high unemployment. 
Data on housing prices show the struggle in the industry that led the boom. The point in our 
analysis on the natural cycle is that, if such a case would occur, the system would not need to 
struggle to go back to the production structure typical of the years preceding the boom (long 
readjustment process). Instead, what the system would need to clear out would be only the 
results of the years of the secondary wave, the speculative one. We could imagine, thus, a 
                                                          
60 See Ferlito (2014b).  
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shorter readjustment process affecting only a smaller number of companies; low growth 
performances should last for a limited period and unemployment should set at a lower level. 
Such conclusions are based, of course, on the hypothesis of absence if manipulations by the 
central banks and the banking system in general. 
   
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The analysis developed so far allows us to conclude, in a very simple way and in the 
wake of authoritative economists of the past, that the cyclical trend is the form that 
development takes in a capitalist economy. 
While acknowledging the basic assumptions of the Austrian business cycle theory as 
valid, especially in Hayek’s version, we must also recognize that it does not suffice to 
eliminate the Central Bank and its ‘deceptive’ role exerted through the monetary interest rate 
in order to annihilate the cyclical dynamics of development.  
The systematic introduction of ‘real’ expectations, acting in ‘real time’, in the sense 
advocated by Ludwig Lachmann, can only lead us towards the rediscovery of secondary 
investment waves (imitations and speculations) on which, in particular, Schumpeter focused. 
In being made possible by a banking policy sensitive to and part of the general positive 
sentiment of an expansion stage, they precisely match that part of the growth stage that has to 
be liquidated through a readjustment crisis. 
We therefore believe that the Austrian distinction between sustainable and unsustainable 
growth is valid. What we rather seek to overcome is the belief that, in the first case, the 
expansion stage is not followed by a crisis. On the contrary, a liquidation crisis occurs in both 
cases. The difference lies in the intensity and duration of the crisis. Most of the long-term 
entrepreneurial projects initiated by entrepreneurs will struggle to be completed in the case of 
a boom generated from the outset in an ‘unhealthy’ manner. For growth set in motion in a 
‘sustainable’ manner, only the imitative and speculative initiatives will not be completed. 
Inasmuch, the positive effects of the first part of the expansion will not be eliminated. It is 
merely a question of ‘clearing up’. We call this instance the natural cycle. In the previous 
case, on the other hand, reconstruction will have to begin from a pile of rubble. 
What the Western world started to experience in 2007 is a typical unsustainable boom, 
ignited by artificial monetary expansion. Quantitative evidences support the conclusion, 
including the modification of the production structure. Moreover, two separate parts of the 
boom (the initial one and the speculative one) are clearly observable. Finally, our framework 
allows us to claim that crisis typical of a natural cycle would ended earlier and after a less 
severe readjustment process.  
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